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Abstract  
In 2007, the citizens of Harare, Zimbabwe began experiencing an intense food 
security crisis.  The crisis, due to a complex mix of poor government policies, 
high inflation rates and production decline due to drought, resulted in a 
massive increase in the number of food insecure people in Harare.  The 
international humanitarian aid response to this crisis was largely successful 
due to the early agreement among donors and humanitarian aid officials as to 
the size and nature of the problem.  Remote sensing enabled an early and 
decisive movement of resources greatly assisting the delivery of food aid in a 
timely manner.  Remote sensing data gave a clear and compelling assessment 
of significant crop production shortfalls, and provided donors of humanitarian 
assistance a single number around which they could come to agreement.  This 
use of remote sensing data typifies how remote sensing may be used in early 
warning systems in Africa.  
Introduction  
Africa has experienced rapid urbanization in the past three decades, but unlike 
many areas of the world, this transition has not been accompanied by strong 
economic growth.  Over the 1970-95 period, the average African country’s 
urban population grew by 5.2% per annum while its GDP declined by 0.66% 
per year (Hicks 2002).  In the coming years, supplying the growing number of 
poor urban residents with safe and affordable food will necessarily strain the 
food supply and distribution system in Africa, particularly in economies that 
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are poorly managed.  Zimbabwe, a country currently experiencing quintuple 
digit inflation, provides a compelling example. This chapter focuses on 
Zimbabwe’s capital city, Harare, and the role that remote sensing has played in 
identifying and responding to food security crises.  In the past few years, 
Zimbabwe has suffered an economic implosion.  Driven largely by the policies 
of the government, the economic crisis has transformed the country from a net 
exporter of food to a net importer.  This dramatic reduction in average per 
capita food production, coupled with extremely high rates of inflation, have 
greatly increased the vulnerability of the residents of Harare to regularly 
occurring climate-related production declines.  Regional food security 
organizations including the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS 
NET) have set up a new food security monitoring program in Harare to 
monitor the ability of residents to access enough food. 
FEWS NET is a program funded by the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID).  It is tasked with monitoring food security in 23 
countries in three regions world wide and is composed primarily of local 
experts who work with specialists in the United States who coordinate their 
reporting.  The organization estimates local food availability, access and 
utilization with a wide variety of datasets, including remote sensing data and 
ground measurements of food production as well as a wide range of other 
indicators meant to measure demand, the ability of a population to purchase 
food, and other political and economic pressures that may affect the food 
security of a region (Brown 2008).  FEWS NET’s objective is to provide early 
and actionable information that can motivate intervention that will break the 
link between climate extremes and famine (Davies et al. 1991; Wisner et al. 
2004). This chapter describes how remote sensing provided the earliest 
possible estimate of the national level food security problem which would 
severely affect residents of Harare, Zimbabwe if no assistance was provided 
from the humanitarian community, motivating a prompt and effective 
response.  
Because FEWS NET usually focuses on rural areas, its food security 
monitoring system in Harare is unique.  In the urban context, understanding 
how different economic groups earn income and gain access to food is the 
basis for evaluating food security.  Urban consumers obtain most or all of their 
food from the market, and thus rely on regional and national food production 
and distribution systems to ensure there is sufficient food available for 
purchase.  National production deficits can be eliminated with imports from 
other regions or from outside of the country.  If there is insufficient foreign 
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currency, lack of political will or lack of sufficient organization to move grain 
from regions of surplus to regions of deficit, then urban areas are likely to 
experience rapidly changing food prices, resulting in food insecurity for the 
most vulnerable groups.   
FEWS NET uses a wide variety of remote sensing data products to estimate 
production at the national and regional level, including earth observations and 
models.  FEWS NET monitors production using remotely sensed vegetation, 
rainfall, and integrated crop models that measure rainfall variability’s impact 
on yield.  It couples these monitoring systems with extensive market price 
analysis and information on how people in the city gain access to food, 
through purchase, loan, barter and other means.      
In the 2006/07 growing season, farmers in Zimbabwe produced less than 
expected and significantly less than the long term average due to poor 
availability of and access to critical inputs such as fertilizers, improved seeds, 
fuel, electricity, labor and draft power (Figure 1).  Land redistribution and 
inefficient agricultural policies aggravated these constraints. Poor rainfall in 
the south exacerbated these larger problems, but it was very unclear at the time 
exactly how much food was produced.  It is now thought that the harvest 
provided 45 percent of Zimbabwe’s cereal needs, leaving the country with an 
import requirement of over 610,000 MT for 2007.  Every province in the 
country faced a cereal deficit, but residents of urban areas had a particularly 
hard time accessing food because of the extremely high inflation rate which 
degraded their purchasing power coupled with high international food prices.  
Remote sensing based production estimates were critical in 2007 to determine 
the scope of necessary food aid interventions from the international 
community. 
The chapter will first present a description of the food security situation of 
Harare and the specialized data that FEWS NET collects to determine the 
needs of its residents.  The use of remote sensing in determining the food aid 
needs in Harare will then be described, along with the technique used to 
estimate variations in agricultural production. Finally, in the last section a 
description of food security in urban areas will be presented which explains 
the key role of remote sensing in providing information about the larger 
national and regional food production.   
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The Emergence of a Crisis 
In the past, Harare and Zimbabwe as a whole coped well with rainfall 
fluctuations, even though they resulted in large variations in food production 
due to the predominance of rainfed agriculture.  During the 1980s and 1990s, 
Zimbabwe was food self-sufficient and exported surpluses to its neighbors in 
southern Africa and beyond, producing significant export income. The country  
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Fig. 1. US Department of Agriculture production statistics for Zimbabwe, expressed as 
a percentage of the 1972-2001 mean. Note the distinctly lower production from 2001 
to 2007 as compared to before 2001. 
survived the droughts of 1982, 1987 and 1992 without substantial disruptions 
of economic activity (Mudimu 2002). Several interrelated problems are at the 
basis of its current vulnerability to food insecurity, with drought being one of 
the least important.  
The problems in Zimbabwe began with the implementation of land reform 
policies in the year 2000 that transferred farms from minority white 
commercial farmers to majority landless blacks.  Although the policies were 
implemented to improve the equity of land ownership within the country, they 
have had a severely negative effect on the economy. The land redistribution 
has meant a complete cessation of organized farming in these formerly 
commercial farm areas, which used to produce enormous amounts of surplus 
food every year.  Before the land reform, organized white farmers utilized 
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sophisticated technology and high levels of fertilizer and seed inputs to 
produce very high yields. The landless who were resettled on the farms were 
not provided with the tools, seeds, or know-how needed to tend them properly 
and have been barely able to grow enough to feed themselves.  In 2005, the 
government exacerbated the economic crisis with an extremely unpopular 
crackdown on illegal shantytowns in the outskirts of Harare, which led to the 
demolition of swathes of informal urban settlements.  Today Zimbabwe is 
struggling to cope with a large number of internally displaced people (IDPs), 
estimated at 570,000 in 2007, according to the Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre.  
By the summer of 2007, Zimbabwe’s inflation rate was the highest in the 
world, reaching more than 3,000% per month.  Erratic rainfall in the 2006/7 
growing season caused production declines which forced a larger portion of 
the population to turn to the markets for food, greatly increasing prices in 
Harare and other urban areas.  A meeting was held in March of 2007 in Rome, 
Italy by the major partners concerned with food security in Zimbabwe 
(USAID, World Food Program, Southern African Development Council, US 
Department of Agriculture, the European Commission, European Global 
Monitoring for Food Security and the European Union’s Joint Research 
Council).  The objective of the meeting was to come to a consensus about 
Zimbabwe’s food security situation, about what could be done to assist the 
country, and to develop a general plan as to how the humanitarian community 
should proceed.  FEWS NET brought to the meeting an estimate of area 
planted, yield and production for the maize sector for the 2006-7 growing 
season.  These estimates made it clear that crop production was going to fall 
far below the levels necessary to provide adequate food. 
As it became clear that food aid would be needed in 2007, the question was 
how much assistance was appropriate.  Because the national government was 
unwilling to admit that they had a food security problem or that its policies 
were the cause, none of the production or planting data coming out of the 
country in 2007 could be trusted.  Although crop areas in the north of the 
country had a very good rainy season, southern portions had experienced 
drought during January and February causing crop failures across these areas.  
Because of the land redistribution, any deficit in production would require that 
Zimbabwe import grain, but the impact of a government controlled marketing 
system, the lack of foreign exchange, and a severely constrained private sector 
due to inflation meant it was uncertain that these imports would be sufficient.  
Having a reliable, independent estimate of national grain production estimate 
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to bring to the Rome meeting was critical to determining the level of support 
that would be needed by the end of 2007.   
Remote Sensing Data to Estimate Maize Production 
FEWS NET routinely uses Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) 
images to identify areas experiencing drought-related reductions in production, 
as well as poor pasture conditions (FEWS 2000a; Field 1991; Hutchinson 
1998), malaria (Hay et al. 1998), epizootic diseases such as Rift Valley Fever 
(RVF) (Linthicum et al. 1999), and damaging pests such as locusts (Hielkema 
et al. 1986; Tucker 1985).  Although NDVI is useful, estimates of production 
are usually calculated by FEWS NET as the product of yield, which is 
modeled with rainfall, and cropped area. While research applications of NDVI 
to crop yield and production (Bullock 1992; Groten 1993; Rasmussen 1992; 
Rojas 2007; Unganai and Kogan 1998) have been made, routine quantitative 
analysis of NDVI is still fairly uncommon. This differs strongly with satellite 
precipitation (Adler et al. 1994; Arkin et al. 1994; Huffman et al. 1995; Love 
et al. 2004; Xie and Arkin 1997) which are routinely used to drive numerical 
models of crop yield reduction (Senay and Verdin 2003).  FEWS NET sought 
a non-rainfall based indicator of production because of huge changes in inputs, 
area planted and methods used in Zimbabwe in the past few years.  
Examination of Figure 1 shows a reduction in production since 2002 which 
confound these models’ assumptions of agricultural productivity (Funk and 
Budde 2008).   
  In 2006 the Vegetation-Sum metric was developed in analogy to the water 
requirement satisfaction index (WRSI) water balance model by Chris Funk at 
the University of California in Santa Barbara, with help from Michael Budde 
at USGS, in order to improve FEWS NET’s ability to predict maize 
production in Zimbabwe (Funk and Budde 2007).  The Vegetation-Sum 
calculation incorporates a lag that combines delays associated with the 
temporal sensitivity associated with grain filling and the delayed response of 
vegetation to rainfall (Funk and Brown 2006; Ji and Peters 2003; Kerr et al. 
1989; Potter et al. 1999; Richard and Poccard 1998).   
      While the WRSI estimates actual evapotranspiration via an extended 
moisture balance, it has also been shown that MODIS vegetation indices can 
be a good proxy for actual evapotranspiration (Chong et al. 1993).  This 
suggests that the sum of NDVI increases over the mid-to-late season growing 
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period should be a good indicator of crop evapotranspiration.  Equation 1 thus 
summarizes the approach that was taken by Funk and Budde to estimate 
production using vegetation data. 
(1)
The v calculation (Eq. 1) incorporates a lag that combines delays 
associated with the temporal sensitivity associated with grain filling and the 
delayed response of vegetation to rainfall (Kerr et al., 1989; Richard & 
Poccard, 1998; Potter et al., 1999, Ji & Peters, 2003; Funk & Brown, 2005). 
We also include a length of accumulation period (LAP), which estimates the 
length of growing period (LGP). LAP determines the length of the window 
over which the NDVI is summed. NDVIonset is subtracted from v to remove 
the pre-onset influences associated with the previous dry and rainy seasons. 
The dates used in this study for the onset of rains were based on a simple 
rainfall accounting method defined as the first 10-day period in which at least 
25 mm of rain fell, followed by two 10-day accumulation periods with a total 
of at least 20 mm of rain. These onset periods were then linked to the closest 
16-day MODIS composite period (Funk and Budde 2008). 
While the equation above is physically plausible there are a number of 
contamination sources that can confound the potential NDVI/ET and crop 
productivity relationship. Temporally, cloud and moisture contamination can 
influence the NDVI signal.  Vegetation signals from before or after the season 
contain variations not related to grain filling.  Thus an onset-of-rains temporal 
re-alignment to account for some of these effects was implemented. Finally, 
spatial filtering was used to minimize the influences of non-agricultural 
vegetation on the Vegetation-Sum results.  Combined with a high-accuracy 
cropped area map based on 30-m Landsat data, the method provided a way to 
calculate relative production with high accuracy.  Figure 2 shows how variable 
the NDVI curves that the Vegetation-Sum metric summarizes can be from one 
year to the next. The x-axis on this plot shows time after the onset of the rainy 
season. The y-axis shows the nationally averaged NDVI minus the NDVI 
value at onset. Thus the adjusted NDVI is zero at the onset of the rainy season. 
A major problem that FEWS NET encountered in implementing this 
method for the 2007 growing season was the cessation of operational MODIS 
NDVI data from Collection 4 processing algorithms in January 2007.  In order 
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to quickly conduct the analysis in March for the April meeting in Rome of key 
donors, FEWS NET appealed to NASA MODIS processing personnel to 
conduct a special processing of the MODIS Collection 4 dataset for the region.   
Since the Collection 4 and the new data from the Collection 5 algorithm are 
not compatible, FEWS NET would need a complete time series from one or 
the other in order to conduct its analysis. By communicating the urgency of the 
situation in Zimbabwe to NASA officials, FEWS NET was able to receive 16 
day composites for the four MODIS tiles over the region for the January to 
March period and the analysis was conducted in time for the key meeting of 
donors in Rome in the spring of 2007.   
The NDVI imagery was used to produce national 2006/07 NDVI averages 
(Fig. 2), and Vegetation-Sum production estimates. Figure 3 shows a 
scatterplot of recent PECAD and Vegetation-Sum production anomalies, 
expressed as a ratio of 2005-06 PECAD production. The 2006/07 Vegetation-
Sum estimate was about 35% below the last season.    
Fig. 2. Composited onset-adjusted MODIS NDVI time series from the onset of rains 
forward (Funk and Budde, 2007).  
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Note that the Vegetation-Sum metric primarily measures yield variations 
associated with environmental drought. Over the 1999-2007 period production 
figures and yields are highly correlated (R2=0.85), and Vegetation-Sum tracks 
with both these time-series (Funk and Budde 2007).  Variations in area 
harvested are not captured with this method. In 2006/07 reductions in  
Fig. 3. Scatterplot of six most recent production anomalies calculated from satellite 
data, expressed a fraction of 2005-06 production. The 2006-07 estimate is also shown, 
together with brackets indicating ± 1 standard error (6%).  In this plot, Sv denotes the 
Vegetation-Sum based metric results (Funk and Budde 2008). 
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cultivated area were probably responsible for a further 15% reduction in cereal 
production (Reynolds 2007).  
Measuring Food Security in Harare 
Although the drought in southern Zimbabwe was relatively mild compared to 
other drought years, the combination of land reform policies and water stress 
produced dramatic production deficits. People in Harare were particularly 
vulnerable to food insecurity in 2007, and thus suffered hunger as a result of 
this reduction in agricultural production.  In order to determine the impact of 
production deficits documented with remote sensing, FEWS NET conducted 
food security assessments that analyzed the access that different groups had to 
food and to cash income in relation to their food and non-food needs. Food 
security experts tracked changes in access to food and income over time.  
While the principles underlying the analysis remain the same between urban 
and rural areas, the details of the analytical approach vary from one context to 
another.  
In a rural setting, it is often most useful to focus on access to food and 
income for different wealth groups. This is because members of a particular 
wealth group generally share the same level of food security and a similar 
limited set of options for obtaining food and income. Members of these groups 
pursue similar strategies at different times of year. The relative homogeneity 
of rural livelihoods makes enquiry into sources of food and income the most 
efficient way to generate a rapid understanding of food security in a rural 
context (FEWS 2000b).  
The same level of homogeneity within wealth groups is generally not found 
within an urban setting. Here, one source of food – the market – is usually 
predominant and so the focus of enquiry generally shifts towards questions of 
cash income and expenditure. In the town, however, there is often a wider 
range of income sources for any one wealth group, and earnings are also less 
regular than in the countryside. However, while incomes tend to be 
heterogeneous in urban settings, patterns of expenditure do not. Poor families 
tend to spend similar amounts of money on similar things, so that an enquiry 
into patterns of expenditure is often the most useful approach for establishing 
an effective baseline for food security monitoring in an urban setting. Since 
urban economies are primarily market-based, and many of life’s essentials, 
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often not paid for in a rural setting (i.e. accommodation, water, firewood, etc.), 
have to be purchased in the town, it is critical for these non-food elements to 
be incorporated into an urban food security analysis (King et al. 2001).  
Income Groups in Harare 
An urban food security monitoring system was set up in Harare in 2001 to 
determine the ability of residents to access sufficient food. This system 
monitors a basket of food and non-food items considered essential to live in 
the city.  The purpose of the monitoring system is to track changes and trends 
over time in relation to the baseline. The monitoring system is focused on 
providing information on the following on a monthly basis:  
changes in the cost of several expenditure baskets (through market price 
information),  
changes in formal and informal sector income levels, and  
estimates of the percentage of households falling below the various 
expenditure thresholds.  
The urban monitoring system identified a set of households at different income 
levels that were vulnerable to changes in food prices and availability and 
monitored their access to food through time. Although the poorest, middle and 
highest-income households were identified with annual salary brackets in local 
currency, the rampant inflation the country has experienced since the 
assessment made these values meaningless, and therefore they are not reported 
here. The analysis, documented in a FEWS NET report by King et al 2002 
published on the FEWS NET website, describes the Harare monitoring system 
and each group in detail. 
     The poorest households had only one income source, either because there 
was only one able-bodied person of working age in the household, or because 
of a lack of capital to start up an informal sector activity. Some households in 
this group are formal sector workers at the lowest salary levels. Others include 
one household member who is engaged in an informal sector activity such as 
small-scale vending. A particular problem for those households active in the 
informal sector is that incomes are irregular and vary daily.  
Households in the next income level have one slightly higher formal sector 
income source (usually from the same categories as the bottom group: factory 
workers, security guards, shop assistants, etc), sometimes combined with a 
second income from small-scale vending. Many of the informal sector 
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participate in home industries (small tuck shops, carpenters, welders, hair 
salons and the like) and some vendors also fall into this income range. The 
highest income level differs from the bottom two by the diversity and number 
of income sources: private and public sector employees with regular salaries 
and formal and informal businesses of various types bring this group’s income 
above the national average.  
The standard of living of the poorest households is low, and they are forced 
to largely do without a variety of commodities that are considered to be basic 
by households that are better off. These include milk, bread, meat, sardines, 
chicken, rice, margarine, bathing soap, and body lotion. In addition, these 
households repeatedly stated that they cannot afford health care or 
transportation. Often they are in debt on their water and electricity bills, 
paying just what they have to pay to avoid being cut off. Items that are 
considered to be essential by these households include maize grain, sugar, 
cooking oil, green vegetables, salt, milling costs, washing soap, vaseline, 
schooling, accommodation, and second-hand clothes (King et al. 2001).  
There is little variation in the diet of the poorest households. They often 
have only two meals per day and most of their calories come from maize 
grain, with a small amount from cooking oil, sugar, and, occasionally, dried 
fish. Vegetables are purchased and add value on the nutritional side, but not 
very much on the calorie side. At the higher end of the income scale, 
households can afford a much richer diet, purchasing milk, meat, kapenta, 
margarine and various other high calorie foods. Absolute expenditure on 
transport, accommodation, clothing and education also increases as households 
become richer, as does flexibility to purchase non-essential items.  
Where do the poorest households live? Unfortunately for those who seek a 
simple targeting system, the poorest households can be found throughout the 
high density and peri-urban areas of Harare. The following are indicators of 
the presence of these poor households: type of accommodation and rent levels, 
the availability of services, and whether or not the family has school-aged 
children who are not attending school. FEWS NET has found that resident 
association committee members and church groups are able to identify poorer 
neighborhoods within each residential area and the poorer residents within an 
area (King et al. 2001). Recent economic upheavals and aggressive 
government policies against squatters have forced many residents who used to 
pay rent for accommodation to move to informal dwellings distributed 
throughout the city, making the poorest even harder to find and more isolated 
than before. 
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Shocks to Food Security in Harare 
During the initial assessment conducted in 2001 to set up the monitoring 
system, households were surveyed to determine issues that impact food 
consumption.  Households were clear about the types of shocks that cause 
them problems. Everyone complained about inflation and the fact that 
residents are constantly battling to keep up with rising prices (Figure 4). 
Associated with this were specific complaints about devaluation, increases in  
housing rents and electricity costs, and rising bus fares.  Vulnerability to 
widespread scarcity due to drought is far higher with inflation rampant. 
Households in both the formal and informal sectors are vulnerable to the 
illness or death of (or divorce from) the person who earns the main income.  If 
this happens it tends to result in a major drop in the standard of living. AIDS is 
a particular threat in this regard. Large, unexpected expenditures (such as on 
funerals or medicines) also cause major problems for poor households, often 
forcing them into debt (King et al. 2001).  
In response to these types of shocks, households engage in a number of 
coping strategies. Most coping strategies are dependent on a household’s own 
human and material resource base. On the expenditure side, the aim is to 
minimize spending on and consumption of all items, particularly those that are   
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on the Food Poverty Line which is calculated using market prices of a minimum 
basket of necessities.   
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considered to be non-essential: purchasing cheaper and poorer quality food; 
walking or cycling rather than taking the bus; purchasing second-hand rather 
than new clothes; sending children and other dependants (including terminally 
ill people) to rural areas to live with relatives; avoiding expenditure by going 
into debt (on electricity, water and schooling payments); avoiding expenditure 
by cultivating crops; moving to cheaper accommodation; consuming fewer 
meals per day. On the income side, the aim is to maximize incomes from all 
sources: for those working in the formal sector, starting up informal-sector 
activities to supplement income; sending children out to work; seeking gifts 
and taking loans from relatives; renting out rooms; selling assets or drawing 
down savings; and as a last resort, engaging in undesirable, high-risk, or illegal 
activities such as begging, prostitution, and theft (King et al. 2001). 
Food Security Situation in Harare in 2007 
Urban agriculture contributed significantly to cereal needs for urban 
households, particularly in Harare which is located in a high-potential 
agriculture area. Unfortunately, urban households had already exhausted food 
stocks from the spring growing season in September 2006. Since then, the vast 
majority of the urban population had been dependent on the market for maize 
and maize meal, with their food access constrained by inflation, low incomes, 
rising unemployment, price controls and the resultant shortages of food and 
other basic commodities and exorbitant parallel market food prices. In 
November 2007, the Zimbabwean economy was stressed even further by 
foreign exchange shortages. As part of the monitoring that FEWS NET had 
been conducting in Harare, price trends of selected basic food items were 
recorded. Many goods had to be purchased on the parallel market, where 
prices had increased from between 100 and 800 percent during the period of 
October to December 2007, with little improvement anticipated until 
government policies change (Figure 5).  
While prevailing food insecurity problems had forced poor urban 
households to reduce or eliminate consumption of meats and other food stuffs 
considered to be luxury items, the consumption of staple cereals had been 
conserved to a large extent but only at the expense to other non-food 
household needs. Coping strategies included reducing expenditures on 
accommodation, health, education and transportation expenses. The majority 
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of people still fortunate to be gainfully employed commuted to and from work 
on foot or bicycles to cut down on transport costs which were high due to the 
shortage of fuel. More and more people deferred seeking medical attention 
from formal health centers and an increasing number turned to cheaper 
traditional and spiritual healers. To save money, urban poor were relocating to 
cheaper informal peri-urban settlements. The saved money was directed 
towards food thereby enabling households to meet their minimum 
consumption needs. In response, local markets in the poor sections of the 
urban areas positioned themselves to cater for customers with low and erratic 
incomes by parceling their food items into very small quantities, tsaona, that 
are more accessible (FEWS 2008).   
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Fig. 5.  Trends in parallel market prices of selected food commodities in Harare. 
In addition to food shortages, low employment, and high inflation, urban 
households had to contend with declining level of services like piped water, 
sewage, electricity, public transportation, and waste collection. While public 
sector financing declined, over-crowding in peri-urban areas put increasing 
pressure on a deteriorating infrastructure. Sewage bursts were common in 
suburbs where the housing density increased significantly. In December 2007, 
459 cases of cholera were reported in two high-density suburbs of Harare, 
attributed by city health officials to the decline in garbage collection, sewer 
blockages and erratic water supplies. The situation was similar in other urban 
areas across Zimbabwe. The decline in public services and infrastructure had a 
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direct impact on household food security, public health, food utilization and 
incomes. Continued power cuts had also affected urban household 
expenditures, with part of a household’s meager income now diverted to 
buying fuel wood for household cooking needs.  
Food Availability in 2007 
In April of 2007, the FAO provided funds to Zimbabwe’s Ministry of 
Agriculture to conduct a national multi-stakeholder crop assessment in May 
2007. The assessment was required in order to move forward on appeals for 
assistance for the country. Immediately following the assessment the 
Government of Zimbabwe declared the drought a disaster and subsequently 
invited the joint FAO and WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment mission 
(CFSAM) to verify the 2006/07 crop production. After its in-country 
consultations and field work, the mission revised the government’s cereal 
harvest estimates upwards because of improvements in crop performance 
prospects brought about by better than expected rainfall amounts and 
distribution towards the end of the 2006/07 rainfall season.   
The government’s cereal production estimate for 2006/07 agricultural year 
was the lowest of the previous four years. The estimated production was about 
59 percent of the average maize, sorghum and millets (pearl millets and 
rapoko) harvests for the past five years and 45 percent of the previous year’s 
production estimate of the four staple crops. Taking the government’s cereal 
estimate as the worst-case scenario, combined with carry-over stocks of 
153,000 MT of maize, Zimbabwe faced a cereal deficit of 1,050,000 MT in the 
2007/08 consumption year.  In terms of rainfall performance, the 2005-6 
season was a relatively good year, and although there were no reliable 
estimates of on-farm stocks from that harvest, anecdotal evidence showed that 
some on farm carry-over stocks existed. The Zimbabwe Vulnerability 
Assessment Commission of 2006 assessment estimated that about 6 percent of 
rural households produced in 2006 more than enough to take them to the 
current harvest (Table 1).  
Questions were raised about the Government of Zimbabwe’s ability to pay 
for and import the planned 400,000 MT of maize from Malawi and the 
remaining 600,000 MT of maize necessary to close the grain consumption gap 
for the 2007/08 consumption year. A look at the recent historical government 
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maize imports and the official foreign currency earnings showed the 
government’s weakness (Figure 6). Available data on exports from the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe revealed that export earnings had been falling 
since 1995. In the last half of the 1990s (1995-99) annual average export 
earnings for Zimbabwe were about US $2.2 million and averaged about 
US$1.85 million from 2001-05. Western countries cut ties with Zimbabwe 
when the   
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
US
 
$ M
ill
io
n
s
 
Fig. 6. Government of Zimbabwe’s increasing financial stress: a declining annual 
export earnings in US dollars.   
government abandoned the rule of law after launching its chaotic and violent 
land redistribution program in February 2000. This resulted in Zimbabwe’s 
foreign currency reserves becoming depleted. Despite the worsening foreign 
currency situation, the government of Zimbabwe managed to respond to 
perceived maize import requirements in the last five consumption years. In 
two consumption years, 2002/03 and 2005/06, it managed to import more than 
600,000MT of maize meeting its maize requirement (Table 1).  
For Harare residents, meeting immediate food requirements in 2007 had 
been achieved at the expense of other socio-economic needs. Electricity, fuel, 
fertilizers, hospital drugs and foreign currency for other economic activities 
were in critical short supply throughout the previous five years (FEWSNET 
2007). In urban areas, water supply was increasingly erratic because of 
constant pipe and pump breakdowns. Very little infrastructure rehabilitation 
and development was carried out. Manufacturing firms could not recapitalize 
enough to reclaim their under-utilized capacity, which is estimated to average 
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between 30 to 40 percent. The situation was made worse by the broken 
economy that limited the availability of employment and other income 
generating opportunities to the public. Inflation continued to scale new heights 
with each passing month, and the general increase in the cost of living pushed 
more and more Zimbabweans deeper into poverty (Figure 6).    
Staple Cereals Balance Sheet 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Estimated Cereal 
Production 
641 1,172 1,882 971 1,648 739 
Estimated 
National 
Requirement 
1,897 1,897 1,905 1,913 1,923 1,923 
Estimated Deficit -1,256 -725 -23 -942 -275 -1,184 
Percentage Total 
Gap 
-66 -38 -1.18 -49.24 -14.31 -61.57 
Percentage Gap 
Human Only 
-58 -24 21.1 -37.9 4.8 -53.0 
Table 1. Main cereal harvest estimates for 2006/07 compared to recent seasons’ 
harvests and their implications for national cereal availability, in thousands. 
Conclusions 
Deficits in agricultural production in Zimbabwe during the 2006/7 period were 
fairly mild if one looks over the past two decades of rainfall variability.  The 
vulnerability of Harare residents had been caused by the large drop in food 
production and resulting economic upheaval due to government policies, not 
by variations in rainfall. Had the rainfall deficits that occurred in 2006/7 
happened ten years before, little response or no response would have been 
required.  Because of the context in which the deficits occurred, however, 
remote sensing data was central to the effort to determine early estimates of 
food production so that plans could be made to provide food aid to the regions 
that needed it. 
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Because of the larger economic crisis in Zimbabwe, variations in national 
food production remain central to the ability of people in Harare to access 
food.  Remote sensing remains at the center of the effort to detect and motivate 
early response to food insecurity.  MODIS data and the Vegetation Sum 
analysis that produced early maize production estimates provided a clear and 
direct way to understand the scope of the problem.  Because the situation was 
a complex economic, political and environmental problem, providing aid on 
the basis of national food production deficits instead of individual or 
household need is an expedient and effective way to rapidly provide assistance 
to regions in turmoil.  Remote sensing analysis provided humanitarian 
decision makers a single number that represented an estimate of food aid 
needed around which they could come to agreement.  This use of remote 
sensing data typifies how remote sensing is used in early warning systems in 
Africa.   
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